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PEACETIME NAVAL REARMAMENT, 1933–39
Lessons for Today
Jamie McGrath
[T]o maintain a navy which is not strong enough to win in battle is the 
worst form of extravagance.
REPRESENTATIVE CARL VINSON, 1934
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 The election of President Franklin D� Roosevelt in 1932 sparked an unprec-edented peacetime naval rearmament that ultimately prepared America 
to fight and win World War II� The Republican administrations of the 1920s, 
driven by isolationism and austerity, had made a series of decisions that left the 
fleet underresourced and therefore incapable of defending the nation from a 
determined adversary� Roosevelt’s efforts, combined with congressional action 
led by Representative Carl Vinson (D-GA), turned around a decade of neglect 
of the Navy, funded a balanced fleet, and revitalized the American shipbuilding 
industry�1 The service and the industry responded immediately, building modern 
ships to designs that had been refined throughout the 1920s�
The post–Cold War decline of the U�S� fleet in many ways mirrors the decline 
that followed World War I� Calls today for a 355-ship “Navy the Nation Needs” 
appear to be in line with the actions taken in the 1930s to recover naval strength�2 
However, the principal actors differ significantly 
in their levels of commitment and coordination� 
Whereas the naval rearmament of the 1930s aimed 
to achieve desired ship numbers in under a decade, 
today’s rebuilding plan projects a completion date 
over forty years in the future� The rapid growth 
of shipbuilding contracts in the mid-1930s forced 
shipbuilders to expand their collective infrastruc-
ture and workforce, while today’s modest increase in 
projected construction rates leaves shipbuilders cau-
tiously optimistic, at best, about investing in growth�
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During the 1930s, the executive and legislative branches worked in concert 
with the Navy and industry to coordinate a rebuilding of the infrastructure need-
ed to build a fleet rapidly in time of war� That level of close coordination is miss-
ing today, which threatens to leave America unprepared for future naval conflict�
AFTER WORLD WAR I: DECLINE OF THE FLEET
On Armistice Day 1918, the United States possessed one of the most modern 
fleets in the world and was building toward a navy equal in strength to the Royal 
Navy� However, post–World War I efforts to end future conflict, initiated by the 
United States and supported by the other major world powers, began in 1921–22 
with the Washington Naval Conference� The resulting Five-Power Treaty called 
for a ten-year capital ship building “holiday” and placed restrictions on the size 
and numbers of future capital ships� To comply with the Five-Power Treaty’s lim-
its, the United States scrapped seven of nine battleships and four of six battle cruis-
ers laid down between 1919 and 1922, and America built no new battleships until 
1937�3 The treaty also restricted the construction of various smaller warships�
However, successive Republican administrations, focusing on fiscal austerity 
and isolationist policies, chose to fund American naval construction at levels well 
below treaty limits� Throughout the 1920s, the General Board of the U�S� Navy, 
tasked with advising the Secretary of the Navy on naval policy, remained frustrat-
ed with the continued refusal of presidents and Congress to fund shipbuilding, 
not merely to have sufficient ships, but to field prototypes of new technologies so 
they could be evaluated in the fleet� While this forced the Navy to explore theo-
ries on the application and operationalization of sea power, ideas alone—without 
modern ships to execute them—were insufficient for national defense� Recogniz-
ing the impact of delaying warship construction, the General Board continued 
to advocate for building to the treaty limits to maintain sufficient capability 
to defend against the Japanese, who were widely recognized at the time as the 
most likely adversary of the United States� Unfortunately, the American political 
climate of isolationism and austerity precluded such shipbuilding, so the board 
continuously tailored its annual recommendations to make them more palatable 
to a reluctant Congress�4
As a result of this congressional reluctance, the U�S� Navy designed and built 
only two classes of ships following the completion in 1923 of the World War I 
construction program� These cruisers and submarines were developed in direct 
response to the perceived threat from Japan� Starting in 1921, the Navy designed 
and built a number of submarines intended to create a force capable of operating 
in Japanese waters, in anticipation of supporting fleet operations in the western 
Pacific� The cruiser program began in response to Japanese exploitation of a 
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loophole in the Five-Power Treaty that restricted the size of individual warships 
but not aggregate tonnage� Japan used this provision to embark on an aggressive 
cruiser-building program that challenged American naval strength in the Pacific� 
The United States initiated its cruiser-building program in 1924 with two units 
and added six more in 1928� In 1927, the General Board requested authorization 
to build an additional twenty-five cruisers, but Congress cut that request in its 
enactment of the so-called Cruiser Act (also known as the Butler Cruiser Bill) on 
February 13, 1929�5
Despite this small and relatively inexpensive initiative to counter the Japanese 
naval buildup, lack of funding and presidential actions that delayed allocating 
available construction funds prevented the building of these vessels until after 
Roosevelt’s election in 1932� By the early 1930s, the fiscal constraints of the Great 
Depression further curtailed construction, leaving the U�S� Navy inferior to the 
Japanese navy in modern warships, especially cruisers and destroyers�
The General Board and other naval advocates, including Admiral William V� 
Pratt, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) from 1930 to 1933, struggled with Con-
gress and the president to maintain a modern American fleet� But their attempts 
were in vain, and American underage warship numbers in the decade following 
the signing of the Five-Power Treaty lagged woefully behind those of the other 
four powers�6 In London in 1930, the world’s major maritime powers agreed on 
further limitations to cruiser, destroyer, and submarine tonnages� After the sign-
ing of what is known as the London Naval Treaty, U�S� policy continued to keep 
the Navy below the levels the treaties allowed, in an effort to lead by example on 
disarmament� By 1932, with Hoover’s proposed further reductions in several ship 
categories, there appeared to be no stopping point for naval disarmament�7
American constraint in shipbuilding ceded the initiative to the world’s other 
naval powers� The other signatories to the Five-Power Treaty continued to build 
warships aggressively in the first decade under the treaty’s constraints, as shown 
in figure 1� Japan, Great Britain, and France each executed construction pro-
grams at levels near or slightly exceeding the treaty limits� Italy’s program, while 
slightly less aggressive, also built ships near to treaty limits in numbers, if not in 
tonnage� In contrast, between January 1922 and March 1933, American warship 
construction remained well below allowable treaty limits� Because of America’s 
anemic shipbuilding program, the four other Five-Power Treaty signatories each 
outbuilt the United States, on average, by over one hundred ships and one hun-
dred thousand tons� Japan more than doubled American shipbuilding output, 
giving it the parity it desired in the Pacific�
By the end of 1933, the American fleet consisted of 187 warships, only eighty-
four of which were underage—less than half the number of underage ships in the 
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fleet when the United States signed the Five-Power Treaty in 1922� This left the 
U�S� Navy 157,280 tons below the treaty limits for underage warships, even when 
including vessels under construction� This amounted to approximately ninety-six 
vessels below treaty limits, accounting for allowances by type� During the first ten 
years under the Washington Treaty system, the United States remained caught 
in a cycle of uncertainty over whether to spend the limited funds available on 
modernizing battleships, developing carriers, building submarines, supporting 
naval aviation, or renewing the destroyer fleet�8
The dearth of naval construction in the 1920s and early ’30s left the American 
shipbuilding industry incapable of rapidly closing the gap between the shrinking 
fleet and the treaty limits� Over the course of the 1920s, the number of private 
shipyards involved in building naval vessels declined steadily� By 1933, only seven 
private shipyards capable of building warships remained, down from twenty-
seven at the end of World War I� Many of the yards that had been building naval 
vessels turned to other products, such as railroad cars, fishing vessels, or luxury 
yachts, to maintain financial solvency�
But the reduction in the number of shipyards represented only a portion of 
the decline in shipbuilding infrastructure� Capacity degraded across the entire 
range of shipbuilding capabilities throughout the 1920s� Among the significant 
losses were the physical infrastructures needed to construct ships, such as build-
ing ways, and the cranes and outfitting equipment that were sold off to cover 
lack of profit� Commercial shipbuilding also suffered during this period, further 
diminishing the shipbuilding industrial base� Shipbuilders were not the only 

















United States Japan Great Britain France Italy
Tonnage (x1,000)Ships
FIGURE 1
FIVE-POWER TREATY NATION WARSHIP BUILDING, 1922–33
Source: Derived from U.S. Navy Dept., Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy for Fiscal Year 1933 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, 1933), pp. 4–5.
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systems, armor, and engineering equipment, and even steel manufacturers, also 
contracted because of the loss of shipbuilding contracts�9
The loss of private shipyards and the underemployment of navy yards further 
led to the loss of workers with critical skills� Design capability eroded as trained 
naval architects and draftsmen left the business, but the loss of shipyard labor, 
especially skilled labor, had the most dramatic impact� During the 1920s, both 
the government’s navy yards and private shipyards were unable to attract work-
ers� In 1923, when the Five-Power Treaty went into effect, private shipyards in 
America employed 68,100 workers� By 1933, less than half that number—33,800 
shipyard workers—remained at work in private yards� Because it appeared that 
jobs were not available in the shipbuilding industry, colleges saw severe declines 
in enrollment in marine engineering and naval architecture programs� Addition-
ally, fewer people were learning the mechanical trades of shipbuilding, because 
active apprenticeship programs were no longer available� Workers who possessed 
those skills, as well as experienced draftsmen and ship designers, drifted away 
from shipyards, both government and private, to other industries in pursuit of 
paying employment� This drain in skilled workers represented “one of the most 
serious handicaps to a revival of shipbuilding�”10
THE 1930s: REARMAMENT BEGINS
The efforts of American naval leaders in the decade leading up to Roosevelt’s 
election prepared the U�S� Navy to build a balanced fleet once naval construction 
authorizations and appropriations arrived� Although the General Board’s influ-
ence waned during Admiral Pratt’s tenure as CNO in the early 1930s, the road 
map outlined in the board’s 1922 U.S. Naval Policy served as a guide for the naval 
rebuilding program of the mid-1930s�11
Three mutually dependent concepts—War Plan ORANGE, the “balanced fleet,” 
and the “treaty navy”—helped secure internal cohesion and external support for 
naval construction when funding again became available� War Plan ORANGE did 
not constitute a specific plan, but it represented the manner in which USN plan-
ners envisioned fighting a war in the Pacific, using “orange” as the code word 
for Japan in U�S� planning parlance� The need to transit the vast open-ocean 
areas of the Pacific to reach the expected battle zone drove fleet and warship 
design throughout the 1920s and ’30s�12 The balanced fleet concept recognized 
that, while battleships remained the cornerstone of the Navy’s ability to control 
the seas, a range of smaller vessels played crucial roles in that effort as well� The 
treaty navy concept that Pratt espoused provided the “magic formula for securing 
appropriations” despite American distrust of war machines and war manufactur-
ing�13 The 1930 London Naval Treaty extended the capital ship building holiday 
to 1937, but it also extended tonnage limits across other classes of warships, so 
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Pratt advocated for building ships within the available treaty tonnage that sup-
ported the aging battle line� Additionally, by the 1930s, the importance of aircraft 
carriers and their associated aircraft had been demonstrated, so—with over 
fifty thousand tons of aircraft carrier tonnage available under the London Naval 
Treaty—the Navy encouraged expansion of the American carrier force�14
Pratt’s successor as CNO, Admiral William H� Standley, and the chief of 
the Bureau of Construction and Repair, Rear Admiral Emory S� Land, worked 
closely with Representative Vinson to shape legislation that satisfied the Navy’s 
construction needs and met congressional expectations for rebuilding American 
naval capability�15 This level of close cooperation between the Navy leadership 
and Congress allowed the Navy to execute shipbuilding plans rapidly when funds 
became available�
Legislation and Directives
A naval enthusiast since his time as Assistant Secretary of the Navy under Presi-
dent Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt possessed an excellent grasp of naval 
issues� Now, as president, Roosevelt had authority over domestic and foreign af-
fairs, which allowed him the resources to achieve the American naval supremacy 
in which he believed�16 In May 1933, as part of his effort to bring the country 
out of the Depression, Roosevelt submitted massive public works legislation that 
became the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), which included provisions 
for funding naval construction� Under this legislation, Roosevelt allocated $238 
million to the Navy—nearly seven times the shipbuilding appropriation for fiscal 
year (FY) 1934� Since shipbuilding was a very labor-intensive activity, its value 
as a work-relief program alone justified this spending, but the boost in deliveries 
of modern naval vessels also improved the fleet� In March 1934, Representative 
Vinson ensured passage of the Vinson-Trammell Act (also known as the Naval 
Parity Act and the First Vinson Act), which made it U�S� policy to build ships up 
to the treaty limits and to replace ships as they aged, as the treaties then in effect 
allowed� These efforts combined not only to provide the U�S� Navy with a modern 
fleet to counter Japanese assertiveness in Asia but also to promote the strength-
ening and growth of the U�S� shipbuilding industry, which had languished in the 
1920s owing to the lack of work�
Executive Order (EO) 6174, issued on June 16, 1933, the day after Roosevelt 
signed the NIRA into law, granted the Federal Emergency Administrator of Pub-
lic Works “authority to allot the sum of not to exceed $238,000,000 to the Depart-
ment of the Navy for the construction of certain vessels, the construction whereof 
conforms to the London Naval Treaty and has heretofore been approved by me�”17 
Coupled with the FY 1933 appropriation, the Navy now had nearly $282 million 
to spend on new construction—a figure twice that allocated for shipbuilding in 
any year since 1920� Naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison credits Roosevelt’s use 
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of NIRA funds to restart the naval building program as the principal impetus of 
the U�S� Navy’s rebirth�18 
On August 3, 1933, less than two months after Roosevelt’s executive order, the 
Navy awarded contracts for the aircraft carriers USS Yorktown (CV 5) and USS 
Enterprise (CV 6), one heavy cruiser, two Brooklyn-class light cruisers, twelve 
Gridley-class destroyers, and three submarines to private shipyards, and con-
tracted for two more destroyers on August 20, 1933� Orders for an additional two 
light cruisers, ten destroyers, and two submarines went to government yards� The 
funds allocated from the NIRA resulted in the construction of thirty-two war-
ships, in addition to the five ships already contracted under the FY 1933 naval 
appropriation� One heavy and five light cruisers authorized by the 1929 Cruiser 
Act remained unfunded�19
After the initial surge of naval construction funded under the aegis of employ-
ment relief, Congress, led by Representative Vinson, acted to provide the presi-
dent and the Navy with permanent authority to build to treaty limits and replace 
overage ships� Vinson’s powerful influence resulted in passage of the aforemen-
tioned Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934, which provided what Vinson referred to 
as blanket authority for ship construction and replacement to treaty limits� Naval 
historian Norman Friedman describes the Vinson-Trammell Act as “fundamen-
tal legislation” that called for the Navy to maintain an underage treaty fleet�20
Vinson and the Navy wanted a long-range plan for naval construction rather 
than an emergency program that was executed only when a crisis arose� Such a 
plan allowed for several improvements, including steady employment of available 
shipyards, incorporation of changes in ship design on the basis of operations, and 
prevention of block obsolescence� Vinson stressed that spreading ship construc-
tion out over several years allowed for the testing of various types and making 
improvements� It also allowed for delaying construction of smaller, more quickly 
built vessels, so that they would be delivered when the larger ships they were 
designed to support became available� Additionally, Vinson argued that building 
ships at a steady, predictable rate reduced unit costs, saving the American people 
money�21
The Vinson-Trammell Act authorized expansion of the Navy from its current 
state, but only to the limits permitted under the Five-Power Treaty of 1922 and 
the 1930 London Naval Treaty� An excerpt from the act follows:
That[,] subject to the provisions of the treaties signed at Washington February 6, 
1922, and at London, April 22, 1930, the President of the United States is hereby 
authorized to undertake prior to December 31, 1936, or as soon thereafter as he 
may deem it advisable (in addition to the six cruisers not yet constructed under the 
Act approved February 13, 1929 (45 Stat� 1165), and in addition to the vessels being 
constructed pursuant to Executive Order Numbered 6174 of June 16, 1933), the 
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construction of: (a) One aircraft carrier of approximately fifteen thousand tons stan-
dard displacement, to replace the experimental aircraft carrier Langley; (b) ninety-
nine thousand two hundred tons aggregate of destroyers to replace over-age destroy-
ers; (c) thirty-five thousand five hundred and thirty tons aggregate of submarines to 
replace over-age submarines�22
Several critical elements in this section of the act demonstrate the close 
coordination between Congress and the Navy that proved critical to restoring 
the fleet� First, the act acknowledged and provided congressional authoriza-
tion for the ships ordered under President Roosevelt’s EO 6174 of the previous 
summer� Second, the act directed completion of the 1929 cruiser program that 
had languished under President Hoover� Third, the act directed the replace-
ment of certain overage vessels, amounting to sixty-five destroyers and thirty 
submarines—two categories in which the American fleet fell woefully short of 
treaty limits—in an effort to build a more balanced fleet� Fourth, the act recog-
nized the intent and letter of the 1930 London Naval Treaty, calculating the avail-
able aircraft carrier tonnage to build USS Wasp (CV 7) to replace USS Langley 
(CV 1) to achieve the maximum number of aircraft carriers allowed under the 
treaty, once the latter ship was converted to a seaplane tender� This also enhanced 
balance by increasing the aviation capability of the fleet�
While these elements of the act allowed for immediate shipbuilding, the 
next section had greater implications for naval construction over the long term� 
“[The] President of the United States is hereby authorized to replace, by vessels 
of modern design and construction, vessels in the Navy in the categories limited 
by the treaties signed at Washington, February 6, 1922, and at London, April 22, 
1930, when their replacement is permitted by the said treaties�”23
This clause provided the authority for which the Navy had longed—namely, 
to plan for and build new warships as the current fleet aged� The date a vessel 
became overage could be predicted, replacements could be scheduled, and con-
struction requirements could be forecast with some accuracy� Accurate forecast-
ing allowed shipyards to hire and retain workers, knowing that a consistent flow 
of new construction was forthcoming�
On its passage, Vinson praised the act, stating that it “is no mere piece of pa-
per� It means real fighting ships� We will provide the money this session to start 
work on part of the vessels authorized�”24 Initial funding arrived when Roosevelt 
allocated forty million dollars from the Emergency Relief Appropriations Act of 
1935 to augment the FY 1935 naval appropriations and start construction on the 
first twenty ships and 225 aircraft authorized in the Vinson-Trammell Act� By 
November 1934, the Navy let contracts and work began on these vessels, nine in 
private yards and eleven in navy yards�25 Although the Vinson-Trammell Act pro-
vided only authorization and not appropriation, it reversed twelve years of naval 
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retrenchment and represented the first significant action explicitly to strengthen 
the Navy between the two world wars�
Nonetheless, to the dismay of naval leaders, President Roosevelt continued to 
react to political pressure by reducing or deferring many of the Navy’s requests 
for new warship appropriations� Roosevelt remained especially sensitive to the 
political influence of those in the American peace movement and other isola-
tionists� The 1935 naval appropriation, approved after the Vinson-Trammell Act 
passed, amounted to just $11�7 million—half of President Roosevelt’s request, 
and less than the previous year’s appropriation before the influx of money from 
the NIRA�26 However, Congress gradually approved funding, but it did so with-
out fanfare, allowing Roosevelt to placate the isolationists by downplaying naval 
expansion and emphasizing that national policy aimed only to build a fleet to 
treaty limits�27
Impact on Shipbuilding Capabilities
It was the authority that the Vinson-Trammell Act granted that allowed the 
Navy to accomplish its prewar cultivation of shipyards that would be capable of 
expanding to build a wartime fleet� In wartime, private shipyards provide criti-
cal surge capacity to build the fleet rapidly� The Vinson-Trammell Act reversed 
the preceding decade’s shrinkage of private shipyards by allowing the Bureau of 
Construction and Repair to distribute construction contracts among private and 
government yards throughout the 1930s� This provided the shipbuilding industry 
with practice in the construction of new ships and new shipbuilding techniques 
in advance of World War II�
But the act authorized more shipbuilding than could be accomplished in 
available shipyards� Existing yards had to expand or more yards needed to be 
opened to build warships� Either option would mean greater employment� The 
path chosen was to expand shipbuilding infrastructure within existing private 
shipyards� No new private companies capable of building warships for the Navy 
opened yards before 1937, but each of the existing yards ramped up manpower 
and production capacity to meet the expanding demand� However, even with the 
building program implemented by the Vinson-Trammell Act and subsequent 
acts, the shipbuilding industry approached the high levels of production needed 
for wartime support only in 1941, spurred by massive 1940 building programs� In 
contrast, by 1938 just ten large private shipyards existed—only a modest increase� 
That number reached forty by 1941 and eighty by 1945, the latter representing 
the full expansion necessary to support the war effort and complete over 1,500 
naval vessels�28 While the Vinson-Trammell Act provided a reliable program and 
appropriations slowly followed, it took several years of combat before the volume 
of production needed for war was achieved� This, however, represented a marked 
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improvement over the World War I program, under which less than 10 percent of 
the projected construction was completed in time for war�
At the dawn of U�S� entry into World War II, the American fleet mustered 
337 warships, consisting of ships built both before and after the signing of the 
Five-Power Treaty (see figure 2)� The peacetime rearmament efforts of President 
Roosevelt and Representative Vinson contributed 95 percent of the modern war-
ships available for the war—over 40 percent of the total active fleet on December 
7, 1941� Because few of the ships laid down in the emergency programs of the 
1940s were completed before the end of 1942, the fleet on hand when the Japanese 
attacked Pearl Harbor differed little from that which existed in the late 1930s� 
The ships already under construction soon more than quintupled the size of the 
fleet—a feat that would have been impossible to accomplish without the deliberate 
building program of the 1930s that the Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934 authorized�
By strengthening the shipbuilding industrial base, American shipyards 
prepared for the wartime surge to build the enormous fleet that eventually de-
feated Japan� From 1940 through 1945, American public and private shipyards 
produced over 1,500 naval vessels, from battleships and carriers to submarine 
tenders and minelayers� This number does not include the thousands of smaller 
vessels, from tugboats to landing craft, nor the massive merchant fleet that car-
ried the American war machine overseas�29
This effort would have been impossible to carry out in 1934, given the de-
pressed state of the American shipbuilding industry at that time� Rebuilding the 
U�S� Navy in the 1930s provided not only the ships that held the line in 1942 but 
also the necessary time and experience for American shipyards to recover from a 
decade of neglect� By doubling the shipbuilding industry’s workforce between 1934 
and 1938, the rearmament effort restored the nucleus of skilled labor that would 
prove so crucial over the next seven years of increased naval construction� Ship-
yards expanded their infrastructure to meet the increased number of ships under 
construction, including modernizing building ways, machine shops, and supply 
chains, thereby setting up those yards for the surge of wartime construction�
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
Second Vinson Act
187 9 36 102 3
 Built before 1933 Authorized before 1933 NIRA Vinson-Trammell Act
FIGURE 2 
SHIPS IN THE U.S. FLEET, DECEMBER 1941
Sources: U.S. Navy Dept., Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1934, pp. 17–19; Cook, Carl Vinson, pp. 90–101; Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, 
www.history.navy.mil/.
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American shipbuilding during World War II was successful because of the 
combined and concerted efforts of the president, Congress, the Navy, and indus-
try in the decade prior to the war�
AFTER THE COLD WAR: DECLINE OF THE FLEET
The decline of the American fleet in the years following the end of the Cold War 
(see figure 3) mirrors in many ways the decline of the 1920s� However, significant 
differences do exist, primarily in their respective forcing functions� In the 1920s, 
a global desire to end warfare led to international treaties that limited the size 
of the fleet, whereas no such conventions exist today� Instead, a perceived post–
Cold War “peace dividend” initiated today’s decline�
There were other significant differences between the two declines� As men-
tioned above, one reason the United States limited investment in naval construc-
tion in the 1920s was its pursuit of isolationist policies that circumscribed its 
commitment to world politics� So, although naval leaders complained that the 
fleet was inadequate to project power across the Pacific, the ships of the 1920s 
Navy were sufficient to defend the Western Hemisphere and meet the Navy’s 
peacetime constabulary missions� In contrast, America not only maintained its 
role as a global leader in the post–Cold War era but also took on the mantle of 
the world’s single hegemon� Today’s fleet of 275 ships is tasked with maintaining 
the same level of presence as the six-hundred-ship fleet of the late 1980s, and as a 
result the fleet is operating at a much higher rate than it was designed to support� 
As Vice Admiral Thomas S� Rowden, Commander, Naval Surface Forces, noted 
























POST–COLD WAR USN BATTLE FORCE
Sources: “US Ship Force Levels 1886–Present,” Naval History and Heritage Command, November 17, 2017, www.history.navy.mil/; 2050 projected battle 
force derived from FY 2019 shipbuilding plan. 
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had 600 ships and were deploying 100, and when you’ve [now got fewer than] 300 
ships and you’re deploying 100, there’s more stress on the force�”30
Just as in the 1920s, the post–Cold War decline of the fleet followed an impres-
sive naval buildup, leaving a surplus of naval capacity once the conflict ended� In 
the final decade of the Cold War, President Ronald W� Reagan’s administration 
dramatically increased military spending in an effort to defeat the Soviet Union� 
Secretary of the Navy John F� Lehman led the drive for a six-hundred-ship Navy, 
an effort that peaked at 594 ships in 1987� Lehman’s Navy relied on recom-
missioned World War II–era Iowa-class battleships; service-life extension pro-
grams for Vietnam-era ships; and large new-construction programs, including 
Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruisers with the new Aegis weapons system, 
Oliver Hazard Perry–class guided-missile frigates, Los Angeles–class attack sub-
marines, Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarines, Avenger-class mine counter-
measures ships, Whidbey Island–class dock landing ships, and Henry J. Kaiser–
class replenishment oilers� Lehman also accelerated construction of Nimitz-class 
aircraft carriers�31
As in the 1930s, the American shipbuilding industry benefited greatly from 
this buildup� Naval ship construction provided 93 percent of all shipbuilding in 
American shipyards in 1985� This level of shipbuilding activity buoyed an other-
wise stagnant manufacturing sector, provided a robust, skilled ship-construction 
workforce, and furnished an abundance of ships from which to draw when Con-
gress curtailed shipbuilding in the 1990s�
The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the subsequent dissolution 
of the Soviet Union on Christmas Day 1991 meant that America and its allies had 
won the Cold War� The aftermath brought calls for disarmament similar to those 
after World War I� While those calls did not result in an international disarma-
ment treaty as in 1922, they did persuade the United States and other NATO 
nations to make internal decisions to capitalize on a peace dividend, including 
drastically cutting military spending� Without a looming adversary, the justifica-
tion for large defense budgets vanished, and the United States abandoned its six-
hundred-ship Navy policies and building plans� From the defense budget’s peak 
in 1985, America slashed defense spending over the next sixteen years, cutting it 
to a low of 3 percent of the total budget by 2000�32
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, resulted in an immediate and 
dramatic increase in defense spending, but spending on naval construction 
remained stagnant through the first several years of the global war on terror� 
Shipbuilding and conversion appropriations remained below 2001 levels in 
current-year dollars until 2008 (see figure 4)� With the additional war appropria-
tions included, shipbuilding accounts rose slowly through the end of the decade, 
and at an average rate of 25 percent through the first half of the 2010s� But after 
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accounting for inflation, shipbuilding appropriations since 2001 have increased 
by only 9 percent�
While the 1980s provided a boom of warship and naval auxiliary construction, 
the 1990s saw curtailment of planned building programs, including truncat-
ing the Seawolf class of attack submarines to three ships from the twenty-nine 
planned� The majority of ships decommissioned in the first decade of the peace 
dividend were Vietnam War–era vessels that had reached or exceeded the end of 
their expected service lives� Since 2000, the Navy has decommissioned 143 ves-
sels, many—such as the Spruance-class destroyers and the Oliver Hazard Perry–
class guided-missile frigates—before the end of their planned service lives, to save 
the cost of maintenance and modernization� During the post–World War I and 
post–World War II drawdowns, the Navy retained large numbers of decommis-
sioned vessels in inactive reserve status� By contrast, during the post–Cold War 
drawdown, the Navy disposed of many of the ships it decommissioned through 
foreign military sales or expended them as targets, making them unavailable for 
reactivation to expand the fleet rapidly� The result is a present-day 275-ship Navy 
with little capacity for rapid expansion in a time of crisis�
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, the Navy has maintained a steady but 
slow shipbuilding pace� Unlike during the 1920s, the modern Navy recognized 
the need to build a balanced fleet that included surface combatants, submarines, 
amphibious ships, and naval auxiliaries� The post–Cold War building programs 
addressed this need, but building across this range of ship types resulted in an 
overall reduction in the funds available to build warships�
The Navy and Congress also acknowledged, as Representative Vinson ar-
gued in the early 1930s, that it was necessary to maintain a minimum level of 
industrial capacity� Keeping production lines operating became one of the goals 
of the shipbuilding program during the post–Cold War drawdown� The Navy 












































U.S. SHIP CONSTRUCTION, NAVY ACCOUNT, 2001–17
Source: Derived from Department of Defense budget estimates for Navy shipbuilding and conversion for FY 2001 through FY 2018, available at www 
.secnav.navy.mil/.
NWC_Spring2019Review.indb   95 2/25/19   10:40 AM
13
McGrath: Peacetime Naval Rearmament, 1933–39: Lessons for Today
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
 9 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
commissioned eighty-one vessels between 2000 and 2018, for an average of just 
under five per year� But that rate merely maintained the status quo for a strug-
gling shipbuilding industry, and the single-ship contracts and uncertain future 
that resulted from this build rate prevented shipbuilders from investing in future 
capacity� Naval drawdowns not only increase production costs but also degrade 
industrial capacity, which severely impacts the Navy’s ability to respond in the 
event a cold war turns hot� 
Again, as in the 1920s, the dearth of new construction caused the American 
shipbuilding industry to contract, with two significant effects� First, low-rate pro-
duction caused an increase in per-ship costs as high as 30 percent� Second, lack 
of naval-construction contracts resulted in the loss of shipbuilding infrastructure 
and the skilled shipbuilding labor force� As shown in figure 5, seventeen ship-
yards have stopped building warships for the U�S� Navy since the end of the Cold 
War� The Navy now depends on seven privately operated shipyards to build the 
future fleet—just as it did in 1932� However, unlike during the 1930s, America’s 
government shipyards no longer build new warships; thus the contraction of pri-
vate shipyards represents an even more severe reduction in capacity�
The concentration of shipbuilding capacity risks significant reduction of 
critical naval capabilities if combat losses occur, or our adversaries target these 
few shipyards, or both� Despite the Navy’s attempts to provide sufficient work 
for each shipyard to maintain a minimum operating capability, the workload 
for warship construction is concentrated in only a few of these yards� Only one 
shipyard is currently capable of building the nuclear-powered aircraft carriers 
deemed critical to the Navy the Nation Needs plan� Destroyer, submarine, and 






1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2018
 Government Private
FIGURE 5
NUMBER OF U.S. SHIPYARDS BUILDING NAVAL VESSELS, 1960 TO THE PRESENT
Source: Derived from “U.S. Builders of Large Ships,” Shipbuilding History, www.shipbuildinghistory.com/.
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remaining two yards involved in building ships for the Navy specialize in am-
phibious ships and fleet auxiliaries�
Huntington Ingalls Newport News Shipbuilding, the only yard building air-
craft carriers, is delivering them at an average rate of 5�6 years per carrier� Sub-
marines are building at an average rate of slightly less than one per year� Orders 
for Arleigh Burke–class destroyers were halted in 2005 but restarted in 2010, with 
the intent of keeping the two shipyards building them in business until the Navy 
completed plans for the Flight III guided-missile destroyers, which will have 
increased anti–air warfare and ballistic-missile-defense capabilities�33 These mul-
tiyear procurement contracts maintain a production rate of slightly more than 
two destroyers per year� But with decommissioning rates of about eight per year, 
commissioning rates of less than five per year continue the trend of a declining, 
albeit more modern, fleet�
The cumulative effect of reduced shipyard employment is that it leaves the 
United States without a viable surge shipbuilding capability� Unlike during the 
interwar period, government shipyards no longer build ships, instead focus-
ing their efforts on maintaining nuclear-powered vessels, to the exclusion of 
most other activities� These navy yards, therefore, contribute nothing to current 
shipbuilding capacity� Additionally, instead of nine navy yards, today only four 
remain, further limiting surge production capacity in time of crisis� Exacerbat-
ing the shrinking of the U�S� shipbuilding industry, over the past three decades 
the Navy severely cut ship-maintenance budgets to save money� Limiting the 
use of shipyards conducting maintenance and modernization activities led to 
the closure of additional shipyards that had specialized in ship repair and severe 
workforce reductions in those that remained in operation�
Without a significant increase in shipbuilding and without a commitment to 
funding maintenance and modernization budgets, the American shipbuilding 
workforce threatens to disappear—again—over the course of the next decade� 
Many of the same complaints heard in the 1920s and ’30s about the drain of 
skilled workers out of the shipbuilding trades echo today� The current workforce 
is aging, and shipyards struggle to recruit apprentices willing to commit to learn-
ing shipbuilding trades, because potential recruits do not foresee a secure future 
in doing so� This decline is reversible, but—as before—only with increased ship-
building contracts�
The one shipyard that has joined the naval construction effort since the end 
of the Cold War—Austal USA, in Mobile, Alabama—demonstrated that shipyard 
trades could be developed from a skilled workforce outside traditional ship-
building regions� When Austal was awarded block-buy contracts for the Littoral 
Combat Ship and Expeditionary Fast Transport, it nearly doubled its workforce� 
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But the commitment to build expeditionary fast transports ends with Austal’s de-
livery of the twelfth ship in 2018, and the last littoral combat ship order is planned 
for 2019� Unless Austal wins the contract for the next-generation frigate, its newly 
trained workforce will have nothing to do�34
Jennifer R� Boykin, president of Newport News Shipbuilding, writes of the 
shipbuilding industry’s cautious optimism resulting from the call for a 355-ship 
Navy� A long-range shipbuilding plan that calls for growing the fleet “provides 
certainty for the shipbuilding industrial base that stabilizes our workforce�” 
She goes on to remind us that shipbuilders are not the only ones depending on 
growth in naval construction� “Thousands of businesses, large and small, provide 
the material, equipment, and services necessary to build our nation’s fleet� Ship-
yards across the country depend on these businesses every day to help us meet 
cost and schedule commitments to the Navy� But that supplier base is smaller 
today than in the past, declining from almost 15,000 companies at its peak in the 
early 1990s to about 5,000 companies today, and many of them have fewer than 
200 employees�”35
Without action to reverse these trends, America risks being unprepared to 
recover this vital sector of our national defense capability� Worse, it will be un-
prepared for future conflict�
2018: REARMAMENT BEGINS?
Like President Roosevelt, President Donald J� Trump has called for rebuilding the 
Navy� His proposal for a 355-ship Navy matches the Navy’s 2016 Force Structure 
Assessment, which determined that 355 ships are necessary to meet the require-
ments placed on the Navy today, the Navy the Nation Needs�36 Congress, too, has 
taken action to make a 355-ship Navy the policy of the United States�
But there the similarities end� The Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934 provided a 
specific and quantifiable shipbuilding program, to be executed within ten years� 
In contrast, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2018 contains 
a single sentence stating that “[i]t shall be the policy of the United States to have 
available, as soon as practicable, not fewer than 355 battle force ships, comprised 
of the optimal mix of platforms, with funding subject to the availability of ap-
propriations or other funds�”37 In 1934, presidential and congressional action 
resulted in real contracts for ship construction, but efforts today have not resulted 
in any significant immediate increases in warship procurement�
The current plan is too little, too late, and has little in common with the robust 
and enthusiastic commitments of the 1930s� In 1933, the Bureau of Construction 
and Repair awarded contracts for new ship construction within two months of 
the issuance of EO 6174; today’s Navy took six months to provide a shipbuilding 
plan to Congress—a plan under which increased construction does not begin 
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until a year in the future� The Navy justifies this delay by the need to conduct 
critical maintenance and modernization of the current fleet, which does repre-
sent a more immediate priority�
However, even when shipbuilding increases begin, the anticipated pace does 
not represent an urgent effort to restore fleet strength� The Navy’s FY 2019 ship-
building plan achieves the Navy the Nation Needs, including a twelve-aircraft-
carrier fleet, in 2060—over forty years in the future� The plan does meet the 
requirements for the Navy the Nation Needs in all other ship categories by 2050—
but that is still over thirty years in the future�38 Between 2019 and 2024, the Navy’s 
shipbuilding plan proposes building only ten additional ships over the previous 
308-ship building plan—an increase of merely two ships per year�39 Congress had 
asked the Navy to budget for an additional fourteen ships over the same period, 
or an increase of two and a half ships per year� Senator Roger F� Wicker (R-MS), 
chair of the Seapower Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
comparing the Navy’s plan with the 2018 NDAA language, put it succinctly: 
“[T]he Navy shipbuilding plan that doesn’t get to 355 ships until the mid-2050s 
is unacceptable�”40
The shipbuilding plan includes provisions for accelerated building, with “ad-
ditional resources, service life extensions, and strong industry response�”41 Re-
sponding to Senator Wicker’s concerns, Under Secretary of the Navy Thomas B� 
Modly claimed that 355 ships could be achieved in the 2030s, and placed respon-
sibility for accelerated shipbuilding on Congress to provide additional funding� 
According to the Congressional Budget Office, that additional funding would 
amount to over three billion dollars—a sum potentially unacceptable to Congress 
and the American public� Vice Admiral Thomas J� Moore, the commander of 
Naval Sea Systems Command, provided specific plans for service-life extensions 
and delayed decommissionings of Avenger-class mine countermeasures ships, 
Cyclone-class patrol craft, and Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruisers, and a pi-
lot program for extending the life of Los Angeles–class attack submarines�42 These 
actions would abate the imbalance between decommissioning and commission-
ing, but, as Representative Robert J� Wittman (R-VA), chairman of the Seapower 
and Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, 
notes, “[T]hat is still of limited utility, you still have to build new ships�”43 Echoing 
Wicker’s concerns, Wittman also criticizes the Navy’s FY 2019 shipbuilding bud-
get submission for being so low, noting, “The floor is $26�2 billion and 13 ships� 
Anything else is unacceptable�”44 Demonstrating Congress’s frustration with the 
Navy’s less aggressive shipbuilding program, the Consolidated Appropriations 
Act of 2018 provides $23�8 billion for ship construction, including building a to-
tal of fourteen ships—five more ships than the Navy requested� Congress’s action 
adds an additional littoral combat ship and accelerates the acquisition of a fourth 
NWC_Spring2019Review.indb   99 2/25/19   10:40 AM
17
McGrath: Peacetime Naval Rearmament, 1933–39: Lessons for Today
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
 1 0 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
expeditionary sea base and the lead ship of the next-generation amphibious war-
ship, the LX(R)�45 There clearly is a disconnect between the Navy and Congress 
over accelerating fleet expansion and the mechanism by which to achieve it�
Current CNO Admiral John M� Richardson claims that sufficient current 
industrial capacity exists to increase production rates�46 Shipyards, however, 
remain reluctant to hire and train additional workers or expand their physical 
infrastructure without assurances of future orders�47 The additional ten ships 
planned, spread out over five years and across seven shipyards, averages to an 
additional 0�3 ships per year for each yard—well below the rates the CNO states 
are possible, and not exactly a level of expansion that encourages investment� 
But Boykin of Newport News Shipbuilding again offers some cautious optimism 
that things are moving in the right direction, stating that “our industry has long 
awaited a signal from the government to prepare, invest, and grow� I believe this 
budget agreement, combined with the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan to grow 
our fleet, are telling our shipbuilding industrial base that it is time for our Navy to 
grow into the larger, stronger, and more powerful force that our nation needs�”48
One similarity with the 1930s buildup is the expansion of block purchases 
of ships� Funding construction of multiple ships at a time using multiyear pro-
curement contracts results in a 10 percent reduction in unit costs by allowing 
shipyards to achieve an economy of scale not available with single-ship contracts� 
The FY 2019 shipbuilding plan and the recently passed Bipartisan Budget Act of 
2018 both allow for multiyear procurement contracts for destroyer, submarine, 
amphibious dock landing ship, and fleet oiler construction�49
In the 1920s and ’30s, America possessed the greatest industrial potential of any 
nation in the world� Although Japan’s naval construction exceeded America’s be-
fore 1941, both sides recognized America’s ability to outbuild the Japanese once 
America reached its full industrial potential� Today, America’s ability to outbuild 
its adversaries is not guaranteed� China presents the most significant threat to 
American supremacy at sea today, as the seventy-eight-ship naval parade staged 
for President Xi Jinping in April 2018 demonstrated� Chinese shipyards are build-
ing modern warships at a rate equal to U�S� yards, but the Chinese shipbuilding 
industry is not operating at full capacity for naval construction� With over a 
dozen shipyards building large merchant vessels, China has the industrial base 
to expand warship construction rapidly; America has no such commercial ship-
building base to expand�50 This disparity puts the United States in the precarious 
position that Japan occupied during World War II: unable to match its opponent 
in building a modern fleet or to make up for losses once conflict begins�
Much can be learned from the peacetime naval rearmament of the 1930s� It 
takes a concerted effort from the executive, Congress, the Navy, and industry to 
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achieve the balanced fleet required to fight and win wars at sea� Today, each of 
these players asserts the desire to rebuild the Navy in this age of renewed mari-
time competition, but coordination among them is missing� The Navy needs a 
more aggressive shipbuilding plan� Congress needs to follow up on its policy 
statement and appropriate the funds required to accelerate ship construction� 
More importantly, the Navy and Congress must work together toward a com-
mon understanding of fleet requirements� The shipbuilding industry’s response 
to calls for a larger fleet naturally lags government action� Therefore, the govern-
ment must collaborate with private shipbuilders to meet the strategic imperative 
of expanding the American shipbuilding industrial base�
Rebuilding the fleet in the 1930s prepared the nation for an unknown war that 
came in 1941� In the same way, the United States must embark on a fleet-rebuilding 
effort now to ensure the nation is ready for the next conflict when it arises�
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